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CASE NOTES
Torts-PRODUCTS LIABILITY-DOCTRINE OF STRICT LIABILITY AP-
PLICABLE IN SECOND COLLISION CASES RESULTING FROM DESIGN DE-
FECTS-Ford Motor Company v. Hill, 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981)
I. INTRODUCTION
In Ford Motor Co. v. Hill," the Florida Supreme Court was
called upon to decide whether the doctrine of strict liability as it
exists in Florida is applicable to a second collision case. 2 Addition-
ally, the court was asked to clarify the strict liability issue for de-
sign defects in manufacturers' products 3
The plaintiff Hill suffered severe injuries when his overloaded
tanker truck went out of control on a wet highway and skidded
backwards onto the median strip. As the rear wheels of the truck
dug into the soft median, the tank tore loose and came to a sudden
halt, causing the still-moving cab to slam into it. This collision in
turn released two latch hooks that had secured the hinged cab.
The cab came loose, snapping open and then shut again, causing
the injuries."
The hooks were apparently released by the forced bending of
two parallel lever rods that had secured them, the result of the
force of contact between these rods and the tank itself when the
tank separated from the body.5 The plaintiff contended the hooks
were thus defectively designed since they should have been at-
tached to the lever rods in opposite directions so that only one
hook would release in the event of both the rods being bent in the
same direction.'
In Hill's action against the truck manufacturer, Ford Motor
1. 404 So. 2d 1049 (Fla. 1981).
2. A "second collision" or "second impact" occurs when an occupant of a vehicle collides
with the interior after an initial impact of the vehicle with some other object. Courts use the
term interchangeably with "enhanced injury" and "crashworthiness." See J. BEASLEY, PROD-
UcTS LIABILITY AND THE UNREASONABLY DANGEROUS REQUIREMENT 445 (1981); Comment,
Products Liability-The "Enhanced Injury Case" Revisited, S FORUM 643, 643 n.2 (1973).
3. Whether design defects warrant different treatment than manufacturing defects in
product liability cases is a widely debated issue. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test
for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33
VAND. L. REv. 593 (1980); Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 30 (1973); Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33
VAND. L. REv. 551 (1980).
4. 404 So. 2d at 1050.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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Company, the trial court granted judgment for the plaintiff.7 Ford
appealed, but the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed.8 How-
ever, since the Florida Supreme Court had never ruled on the issue
of strict liability in a second collision situation, the appellate court
certified the question to the Florida Supreme Court as one of great
public importance." In answer to the certified question, the su-
preme court unanimously held that strict liability is applicable to a
second collision case, 10 and it applies "without distinction as to
whether the defect was caused by the design or the
manufacturing."'"
This note will examine the development of products liability law
in Florida as it relates to second collision cases resulting from de-
sign defects and will then analyze the approach taken by the Hill
court. This note will also examine some approaches taken by other
jurisdictions that set forth guidelines for the jury in the area of
design defect cases.
II. PRIOR FLORIDA LAW
The issue of a manufacturer's liability for injuries sustained in a
second collision was first presented to the Florida Supreme Court
in 1976 in Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho.12 At the time Evancho was
7. Id. at 1049. The original complaint was filed before the Florida Supreme Court's deci-
sion in West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976), in which the court adopted
the doctrine of strict liability for Florida. See infra note 20 and accompanying text. Al-
though the complaint did not contain a count in strict liability the trial court ruled that
because of the West decision the standard jury instruction on strict liability would be given.
404 So. 2d at 1050.
8. Ford Motor Co. v. Hill, 381 So. 2d 249, 251 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
9. The Florida Supreme Court has discretionary jurisdiction to review decisions of dis-
trict courts of appeal that pass upon certified questions of great public importance. FLA. R.
App. P. 9.030(a)(2)(A)(v) (1979). This jurisdiction arises out of FLA. CONST. art. V, § 3(b)(4).
The question certified to the supreme court was: "IS THE COMMON LAW NEGLI-
GENCE THEORY IN SECOND COLLISION CASES SET FORTH IN EVANCHO STILL
VIABLE DESPITE THE ADOPTION OF STRICT LIABILITY IN WEST V. CATERPIL-
LAR TRACTOR COMPANY, INC.?" 404 So. 2d at 1049. The supreme court rephrased the
question as follows: "(1) Does the doctrine of strict liability adopted in West apply to a
second collision case, or (2) Is a plaintiff limited exclusively to a negligence action by
Evancho?" Id. at 1049-50 n.1. At the time of the Hill decision, Ford Motor Co. v. Evancho,
327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976), was the leading case in Florida on a manufacturer's liability in a
second collision situation.
10. 404 So. 2d at 1049-50.
11. Id. at 1052 (footnote omitted).
12. 327 So. 2d 201 (Fla. 1976). In Evancho, appellee's husband died from injuries sus-
tained in an automobile collision in which he was thrown forward and struck the front seat
of the automobile in which he was riding. The front seat then broke loose, exposing sharp
and pointed edges of a rail and resulting in further injuries (the "second collision") from
which the husband died. Appellee alleged that the fatal injury occurred as a result of a
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decided, there were two widely cited cases representing the two op-
posing viewpoints on the issue. In the first case, Evans v. General
Motors Corp.,"a the Seventh Circuit saw the issue as a matter of
"intended use" and held "[t]he intended purpose of an automobile
does not include its participation in collisions with other objects,
despite the manufacturer's ability to foresee the possibility that
such collisions may occur. '' l4
The other viewpoint was espoused by the Eighth Circuit in Lar-
sen v. General Motors Corp.15 The court in Larsen rejected the
"intended use" construction as "much too narrow and unrealis-
tic."16 Recognizing that collisions and the resulting injuries from
second collisions are inevitable and foreseeable, the Larsen court
defectively designed track-and-rail mechanism designed to secure the seat to the rail. Id. at
202.
13. 359 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied 385 U.S. 836 (1966). In Evans, the driver of a
station wagon suffered fatal injuries when another car struck the driver's door, causing the
entire left side of the wagon to collapse. The court held that the automobile manufacturer
was under no duty to equip all of its automobiles with perimeter frames. Id. at 823, 825.
Evans was followed in only a few jurisdictions. See, e.g., Schemel v. General Motors Corp.,
384 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1967); McClung v. Ford Motor Co., 333 F. Supp. 17 (S.D.W. Va.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 472 F.2d 240 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 940 (1973); Walton v.
Chrysler Motor Corp., 229 So. 2d 568 (Miss. 1969). Evans was later overruled in Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977). Evans was also highly criticized by the
commentators. See, e.g., Nader & Page, Automobile Design and the Judicial Process, 55
CAL. L. REV. 645 (1967); Note, Manufacturer's Liability for an "Uncrashworthy" Automo-
bile, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 444 (1967); Note, Torts-Liability of Maker of Chat-
tel-Manufacturer Is Not Liable for Failure To Design "Crashworthy" Automobile, 80
HsAv. L. REV. 688 (1966); Note, Products Liability-Manufacturer Has No Duty to Design
an Automobile Frame Which Will Protect Occupants in Case of a Collision, 42 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 111 (1966); Note, Automobile Design Liability: Larsen v. General Motors and
its Aftermath, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 299 (1969-70). Contra Hoenig & Werber, Automobile
"Crashworthiness": an Untenable Doctrine, 20 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 578 (1971).
14. 359 F.2d at 825.
15. 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). The driver of a Corvair was severely injured in a head-
on collision when the steering column was thrust backward, striking the driver's head. Id. at
496-97. Larsen was a negligence case, but the court noted that the same principles could
apply to a strict products liability action, and that each state was "free to supplement com-
mon law liability for negligence with a doctrine of strict liability for tort as a matter of social
policy expressed by legislative action or judicial decision." Id. at 503 n.5. For a list of the
many jurisdictions adopting the Larsen view, see 565 F.2d at 110-11.
16. 391 F.2d at 502. The Larsen court held that the manufacturer would not be liable for
a design defect that did not cause the accident, but "for that portion of the damage or
injury caused by the defective design over and above the damage or injury that probably
would have occurred as a result of the impact or collision absent the defective design." Id. at
503.
The apportionment of damages was not discussed in Hill, but the courts which have
passed on this issue have taken the position of the Larsen court. See, e.g., Higginbotham v.
Ford Motor Co., 540 F.2d 762 (5th Cir. 1976); Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726 (3d Cir. 1976)
(burden of proving the proper apportionment of damages rests on the plaintiff). See also
Note, Apportionment of Damages in the "Second Collision" Case, 63 VA. L. REV. 475
(1977).
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imposed liability on the manufacturer for injuries in a second colli-
sion. The Eighth Circuit reasoned that the intended use of an au-
tomobile "is to provide a means of safe transportation.""
The Florida Supreme Court adopted the Larsen view, extending
a manufacturer's liability to a second collision case and holding
that "the manufacturer must use reasonable care in design and
manufacture of its product to eliminate unreasonable risk of fore-
seeable injury."1 8 In explaining its decision, however, the Florida
court noted that the decision was not based on strict tort liability,
but on common law negligence principles.1 9
Five months after the Evancho decision, the supreme court de-
cided West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.20 in which the court adopted
the doctrine of strict products liability for Florida in the form of
section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts.21 Section 402A
makes a manufacturer strictly liable for selling a product in a "de-
fective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer"
of that product.22 In the West decision, however, the court gave no
17. 391 F.2d at 502 (emphasis added).
18. 327 So. 2d at 204.
19. Id. at 203. Subsequent to the decision in Evancho, the Fourth District Court of Ap-
peal upheld a plaintiff's recovery against an automobile manufacturer despite a jury instruc-
tion which provided that "[i]mplicit in the duty of a manufacturer of a potentially danger-
ous commodity to warn of the dangers of its use, is the duty to warn with a degree of
intensity that would cause a reasonable man to exercise, for his own safety, precaution com-
mensurate with the potential danger." Ford Motor Co. v. Havlick, 351 So. 2d 1050, 1050
(Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1977). A vigorous dissent by Letts, J., objected to the instruction as
being tantamount to absolute liability for any potentially dangerous product. Thus, the in-
struction went beyond the negligence standad adopted in Euancho and even further than
strict liability, which had not yet been adopted in Florida. Id. at 1050-51.
20. 336 So. 2d 80 (Fla. 1976).
21. Section 402A states:
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or
Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous
to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm
thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in Subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1964).
Section 402A has been widely accepted. Dean Prosser noted that by 1971, § 402A had
been adopted by two-thirds of the courts. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS
§ 98 (4th ed. 1971).
22. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 402A(1) (1964).
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indication of the applicability of the strict liability doctrine to sec-
ond collision or design defect cases.
The Hill court addressed the unanswered question of West by
holding that "[iut should make no difference whether the injury is
caused in a primary collision or a secondary collision, so long as the
plaintiff establishes the requisites of West. ' Unfortunately, the
supreme court's holding in West is a major source of confusion.24 A
close reading of West reveals that although the court expressly
adopted section 402A,' 5 the court still has not defined which view
of strict liability is applicable in Florida. At one point in its West
decision, the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of section
402A was equated with the concept of unmerchantability in an im-
plied warranty action, and strict liability was equated with negli-
gence per se.2'6 Additionally, the West court, in its summation of
its holding, completely eliminated the "unreasonably dangerous"
requirement:27 "We therefore hold that a manufacturer is strictly
liable in tort when an article he places on the market, knowing it is
to be used without inspection for defects, proves to have a defect
that causes injury to a human being."'"
To add to the confusion over the adoption of the section 402A
standard, the court in West ruled that the doctrine of comparative
negligence should be applied to a strict products liability action.'
This was a departure from the section 402A standard, which pro-
vides that only assumption of the risk and misuse of the product
could be a defense to a strict liability action."0
Significantly, the Hill court did not discuss the issue of compara-
tive negligence in a situation in which the defect did not cause the
accident, but only contributed to the injuries. Although West in-
23. 404 So. 2d at 1051.
24. "This Court recognizes that confusion might have been created by the adoption of
strict liability for products liability cases in West and the Court's failure to enunciate what
effect, if any, West would have on secondary collision claims and their theory of recovery."
404 So. 2d at 1050 (footnote omitted). For a thorough analysis of the West holding, see
Note, Products Liability in Florida Under Section 402A: New Language or New Law, 29 U.
FLA. L. REV. 398 (1977).
25. 336 So. 2d at 87.
26. Id. at 88, 90. See J. BEASLEY, supra note 2, at 289.
27. The elimination of the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement is similar to the stan-
dard adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod., 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
28. 336 So. 2d at 92.
29. Id. It is anomalous to speak in terms of comparative fault or negligence, since the
determination of a manufacturer's strict liability is in reference to the nature of the product,
not the manufacturer's fault, and thus provides no basis for comparison with the plaintiff's
actions. See infra notes 58-62 and accompanying text.
30. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comments h, n (1964).
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troduced comparative negligence into the strict liability equation,
it would be a mistake to apply the comparative negligence princi-
ples to a second collision case. To compare the negligence of the
plaintiff with the negligence of the manufacturer is to defeat the
purpose of strict liability:
The conduct of another defendant or of the plaintiff prior to the
second collision is not relevant in determining the second collision
liability of the manufacturer of the defective vehicle or in deter-
mining the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. If under the
doctrine the manufacturer must foresee the first collision, then it
begs the question to blame or to review the conduct bringing
about that collision. The true issue is whether the design or the
manufacture (the former in the vast majority of these cases) of
the vehicle afforded adequate protection against the possible con-
sequences of the initial impact.81
III. SECOND COLLISIONS
Simply stated, the issue in a second collision case is whether the
manufacturer must recognize that collisions are a foreseeable con-
sequence of using motor vehicles for transportation, and if so,
whether the manufacturer must design the product in a manner
that is reasonably safe for this environment.3 2 In Evancho, the de-
termination had been made that a manufacturer would be liable if
he negligently designed his product so as to enhance the plaintiff's
injuries.3 The Hill court, in light of West, had to determine the
appropriateness of measuring the design without regard to the neg-
ligence of the manufacturer, i.e., strict liability.
This question was affirmatively answered in Hill when the court
held that refusal to impose strict liability for second collision inju-
ries would create an "illusory distinction" between them and those
caused by a primary collision. The court explained that "[iut
would be unreasonable to have the availability of the strict liability
theory depend on the cause of the accident rather than the cause
of the injury."" Thus, the court rightly recognized that the exten-
31. J. BEASLEY, supra note 2, at 453 (emphasis in original).
32. Montgomery & Owen, Reflections on the Theory and Administration of Strict Tort
Liability for Defective Products, 27 S.C.L. REv. 803, 834 (1976). See also W. KIMBLE & R.
LESHER, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 253 (1979 & Supp. 1981). See generally Annot., 42 A.L.R.3d
560 (1972 & Supp. 1981).
33. 327 So. 2d at 204.
34. 404 So. 2d at 1050-51.
35. Id. at 1051.
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sion of strict liability to encompass enhanced injuries from a man-
ufacturer's design is consistent with what has been called "prevail-
ing notions of the appropriate scope of responsibility for
manufacturing enterprises.''
The supreme court noted that the majority of jurisdictions today
has applied the strict liability doctrine to second collision cases.8 7
This seems to be in recognition of the fact that the doctrine has
developed to a point where public policy justifies holding manufac-
turers responsible for designing their products so they will be rea-
sonably safe in a collision.
There are several policies usually advanced for the strict liability
doctrine. First, the manufacturer, by marketing and advertising his
product, has induced the consumer to buy a product which he has
represented as safe. Second, the manufacturer is in the best posi-
tion to eliminate defects. Third, the manufacturer is in a better
position to spread the risk of injury through the use of liability
insurance. Finally, strict liability will provide a healthy incentive
to manufacturers to make their products safe. 8
These strict liability policies are no less applicable in a second
collision case than in any products liability case." As one commen-
tator has noted:
Enhanced injury case plaintiffs would seem in no less need of
compensation than their counterparts in other products cases.
The manufacturer-defendants in enhanced injury cases would
certainly seem no less capable of bearing the loss than manufac-
turers of other products; indeed, considering that the manufactur-
ing-defendants in enhanced injury cases consistently involve the
giants of the industrial world, it would seem that if a less strin-
gent standard of strict liability is to be applied anywhere, it
should be applied to the smaller manufacturers involved in prod-
ucts cases of a type other than the enhanced injury variety. Fi-
nally, there would seem to be no shortage of need in the enhanced
injury situation for the incentive toward improvement of product
quality-that is, product safety-which strict liability has the po-
tential to provide.40
36. Montgomery & Owen, supra note 32, at 835.
37. 404 So. 2d at 1051. For a list of jurisdictions that have adopted strict liability for
second collision cases, see 404 So. 2d at 1051 n.3. But see Sealey v. Ford Motor Co., 499 F.
Supp. 475 (E.D.N.C. 1980); Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Young, 321 A.2d 737 (Md. 1974).
38. See generally Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss.
L.J. 825, 826 (1973).
39. Comment, supra note 2, at 683-84; Note, supra note 16, at 486-90.
40. Comment, supra note 2, at 684 (emphasis in original).
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The Hill court quotes with approval from the decision of Huff v.
White Motor Corp., 1 in which the Seventh Circuit overruled its
previous "intended purpose" decision of Evans and adopted strict
liability for second collision cases:
There is no rational basis for limiting the manufacturer's liability
to those instances where a structural defect has caused the colli-
sion and resulting injury. This is so because even if a collision is
not caused by a structural defect, a collision may precipitate the
malfunction of a defective part and cause injury. In that circum-
stance the collision, the defect, and the injury are interdependent
and should be viewed as a combined event. Such an event is the
foreseeable risk that a manufacturer should assume. Since colli-
sions for whatever cause are foreseeable events, the scope of lia-
bility should be commensurate with the scope of the foreseeable
risks.412
This rationale indicates that the foreseeable collision does not
break the causal chain from the defective design to the plaintiff's
injury and that the defective design is a proximate cause of the
plaintiff's injury.43 Similarly, although liability in Larsen was
based on the concept of the manufacturer's duty, the court's com-
ments on "intended use" imply that the defective design is a proxi-
mate cause of the plaintiff's injury."
IV. DESIGN DEFECTS: STRICT LIABILITY OR NEGLIGENCE?
Although injuries in a second collision case may come about as a
result of a manufacturing error, in the vast majority of cases they
occur in the context of a design defect.' 5 Because of the following
distinction between the two types of defects, courts and juries have
a more difficult time in defining the elusive concept of "defect" in
design cases.46 The manufacturing error arises when the particular
product deviates from all the other products like it in a given prod-
uct line.'7 In these cases, it is not difficult to identify the defect in
41. 565 F.2d 104 (7th Cir. 1977).
42. 404 So. 2d at 1052 (quoting Huff v. White Motor Corp., 565 F.2d at 109).
43. See Comment, supra note 2, at 671-73.
44. W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 32, § 253.
45. J. BEASLEY, supra note 2, at 454.
46. A. WEINSTEIN, A. TWERSKI, H. PIEHLER & W. DONAHER, PRODUCTS LIABILrY AND THE
REASONABLY SAFE PRODUCT: A GUIDE FOR MANAGEMENT, DESIGN, AND MARKETING 43-51
(1978) [hereinafter cited as A. WEINSTEIN].
47. Id. at 29. See also 2 L. FRUMEE & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16 A[4][f][iii]
(1960 & Supp. 1981); W. KIMBLE & R. LESHER, supra note 32, §§ 151-55; R. EPSTEIN, MOD-
ERN PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW 68 (1980).
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the product. Generally, the standard for comparison is inter-
nal-the manufacturer's own quality standard based on the
blueprint for the product."
On the other hand, in the design cases there is no built-in stan-
dard for determining defect.4 9 When a plaintiff attacks the design
of a product, he is focusing on the conscious choice of the manu-
facturer; the design meets the standard that the manufacturer has
set for himself.5 0 Five years prior to the Hill decision, Evancho es-
tablished that a manufacturer's liability in negligence extended to
defects in design as well as in manufacture. In Evancho, the su-
preme court held that a "manufacturer of automobiles may be lia-
ble under certain conditions for a design or manufacturing defect
which causes injury but is not the cause of the primary collision. '5 1
The issue for the Hill court to resolve was whether the strict
liability theory is appropriate for a design defect, since there is no
internal standard for determining whether a product is defective in
design. The defendant, Ford Motor Co., argued that a negligence
standard should be applied for design defects, unlike manufactur-
ing flaws for which strict liability should be permitted.52 Ford con-
tended that the product blueprint is a guide to manufacturing er-
rors and can assist jurors in determining whether a defect exists.53
In comparison, a design defect involves technical issues too com-
plex for a jury without engineering training or experience in
manufacturing."
In response to Ford's arguments, the supreme court reasoned:
[Alnalysis of whether a product is in a defective condition unrea-
sonably dangerous to the user involves a negligence analysis in a
"design defect" case, unlike the analysis ordinarily required in a
"manufacturing flaw" situation. But this does not mean it is erro-
neous to apply the doctrine of strict liability to design defect
cases.
55
This language is confusing, and perhaps unfortunate because the
court neglected to explain further the analysis to which it alluded.
48. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 31.
49. Id. at 32.
50. Id. See also Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product De-
sign: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REV. 773, 773-74
(1979).
51. 327 So. 2d at 202.
52. 404 So. 2d at 1051. See Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 643-49.
53. 404 So. 2d at 1051.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 1051-52 (emphasis added).
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Many commentators today have concluded that the standard for
design defect must employ a balancing process.5 6 This balancing
process involves a weighing of product risk versus the product
utility.51
The Hill court's characterization of the standard for determining
design defect as a "negligence analysis," without more, leaves the
court vulnerable to the criticism that they have merged the two
theories of recovery. The critical distinction which the supreme
court failed to note between the balancing involved in negligence
and in strict liability is that the strict liability theory is not con-
cerned with the conduct of the manufacturer. 8 Rather, the inquiry
focuses on the nature or condition of the product and seeks to de-
termine whether the product is defective, irrespective of how or
why it became defective.5 9 Even though the manufacturer has ac-
ted reasonably, the product may in fact not be reasonably safe, and
thus defective. e An action in negligence requires additional proof
that there was something unreasonable about the defendant's con-
duct in allowing the product to be placed on the market: "In strict
liability, this is not required; all that the plaintiff must do is show
that the product was in the dangerous condition when it left the
defendant's control." 1
Although the supreme court in Hill acknowledged that "the bet-
ter rule"6 is to apply the strict liability test to all manufactured
products, the court failed to define such a test. As noted, the test
for determining when a product is defective becomes crucial in the
context of an alleged design defect where there is no internal stan-
dard by which to measure the product." The critical weakness in
the Hill opinion, therefore, is the supreme court's failure to set
56. See, e.g., Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 649; Wade, supra note 3, at 568-70; Montgom-
ery & Owen, supra note 32, at 818.
57. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 32. See also Montgomery & Owen, supra note 32, at
818.
58. E.g., The Restatement states that its strict liability rule applies even though "the
seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his product. RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A(2)(a) (1964).
59. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 30. The plaintiff in a strict liability action must
prove:
(1) that a defect was present in the product;
(2) that the defect caused the injuries complained of; and
(3) that the defect existed at the time the retailer or supplier parted possession
with the product.
2 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 16A[4][e][i] (1960).
60. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 32.
61. Wade, supra note 3, at 553.
62. 404 So. 2d at 1052. Contra, Birnbaum, supra note 53, at 649.
63. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
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forth definite guidelines for determining when a manufacturer's
design is defective.
V. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
The jury is the ultimate arbiter of this conflict, and the instruc-
tions which the court gives to them must clearly set forth the man-
ner in which to determine whether a manufacturer's product is ac-
tionable because of a defect in design. This instruction must take
into account the risk/utility analysis involved in order to insure
that the manufacturer is not absolutely liable for his products. In
addition, it must focus on the defectiveness of the product instead
of any unreasonable conduct on the part of the manufacturer.
The Hill decision is commendable in that it noted that the stan-
dard jury instruction on products liability needs improvement."
The court directed the committee on standard jury instructions to
"develop and present to this Court an appropriate instruction
which adequately addresses the issue and which reflects the hold-
ing of the instant case." 5 With no decisional guidance, however,
the committee has no precedent with which to define
defectiveness.
The current instruction's definition of defective as "unreasona-
bly dangerous" represents an elusive concept; sending the jury off
to deliberate with only this bare charge invites it to put emotions
above the fact-finding process. Additional instruction explaining
the analysis involved is imperative if the jury is to understand its
duty in this important area of the law.
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A defines "unreasona-
bly dangerous" as "dangerous to an extent beyond that which
would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases
it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to
its characteristics."" The consumer expectation test, while easy to
64. 404 So. 2d at 1052 n.4.
65. Id. The present standard jury instruction on strict products liability reads in part as
follows:
The issues for your determination on the claim of (claimant) against (defendant)
are whether the [product sold or supplied] by (defendant) was defective when it
left the possession of (defendant) and, if so, whether such defect was a legal cause
of [loss, injury, or damage] sustained by [claimant]. A product is defective if it is
in a condition unreasonably dangerous to the user and the product is expected to
and does reach the user without substantial change affecting that condition.
FLA. STAND. JURY INSTRUCTIONS § PL (1981).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, comment i (1964). For a history of the
events leading up to the inclusion of "unreasonably dangerous" in the Restatement formula-
tion, see Wade, supra note 38, at 830-31. See also Prosser, Strict Liability to the Consumer
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apply in a manufacturing flaw case, proves more difficult in the
case of a design defect. This test is too vague for design defects
since the consumer rarely has any expectations of safety regarding
some complexly designed products." In addition, the "consumer
contemplation" aspect suggests that if the product's dangers are
obvious to the consumer, the manufacturer is to be absolved from
liability. 8
Other courts have recognized the inadequacies of the consumer
expectation test and have rejected or modified the Restatement
standard. These courts have recognized the complexities involved
in product litigation and have attempted to articulate the stan-
dards they reason are required in defining the design defect con-
cept. The judges rightly see themselves as weavers of the "'rich
tapestry' of the developing common law of products liability." 9
While the courts are still struggling in this area, a look at some of
the more significant efforts is appropriate here to suggest potential
approaches for the Florida courts.
The journey begins, not surprisingly in California, a prominent
trend-setter in many areas of the law, including products liability.
In Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp.,0 the California Supreme Court
expressly rejected the "unreasonably dangerous" requirement of
section 402A of the Restatement. No substantive definition of a
defective product was provided in its place, however. In response
to concern over the meaning of "defective," the supreme court in
Barker v. Lull Engineering Co.,7 1 developed a two-pronged test for
in California, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 9, 23-27 (1966). The "unreasonably dangerous" requirement
has been widely debated. See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 3, at 32; Wade, supra note 38, at 832;
Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 599-649. Some jurisdictions have modified or eliminated it in
their view of strict liability. These cases will be discussed in part V, infra.
67. See, e.g., Cassisi v. Maytag Co., 396 So. 2d 1140 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1981), in
which the court addressed the applicability of the "unreasonably dangerous" standard to
design defects. Although noting that some jurisdictions had abandoned the "unreasonably
dangerous" requirement because it was ambiguous, the court reasoned that the standard is
easily applied to manufacturing errors. When applied to design defects, however, the stan-
dard is vague because the ordinary consumer cannot be said to have 'any safety expectations
for many complexly made or designed products: "Our primary concern with the frustration
of the ordinary consumer's expectation standard is its indiscriminate application to all types
of design defects." Id. at 1146. The court did not pursue the formulation of a modified
standard because the defect alleged was presumed to be from manufacturing and not from
design: "The Restatement standard is particularly appropriate, however, to the facts before
us." Id. See also Keeton, supra note 3, at 37.
68. A. WEINSTEIN, supra note 46, at 45-46.
69. Birnbaum, supra note 3, at 610. The author advocates the adoption of a pure negli-
gence standard in design defect cases.
70. 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 443 (1972).
71. 143 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1978). Plaintiff Barker was seriously injured in an accident when
he was operating a high-lift loader at a construction site. He alleged, among other things,
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
design defect liability. The jury is instructed that a product is de-
fective in design if:
(1) the plaintiff proves that the product failed to perform as
safely as an ordinary consumer would expect when used in an in-
tended or reasonably foreseeable manner, or (2) the plaintiff
proves that the product's design proximately caused injury and
the defendant fails to prove, in light of the relevant factors, that
on balance the benefits of the challenged design outweigh the risk
of danger inherent in such design.
72
The first prong of the test is essentially the Restatement formula-
tion. The problem, however, that the California court had with the
Restatement standard was that it treated ordinary "consumer ex-
pectations as a 'ceiling' on a manufacturer's responsibility under
strict liability principles, rather than as a 'floor.' ",7" Additionally,
the court recognized that because an ordinary consumer does not
know how safe the product could be made, these expectations
"cannot be viewed as the exclusive yardstick for evaluating design
defectiveness. '7 4 The innovative element of Barker lies in its shift-
ing of the burden of proof as part of the second prong. This shift,
the court reasoned, would be a way to relieve the plaintiff of the
burdens of proof inherent in a negligence action, and thus would
significantly distinguish between negligence and strict liability.7 5
Additionally, the court reasoned that the defendant is in a better
position to know the evidentiary matters that are involved in a
risk-benefit standard.7 6
Nevertheless, the shifting of the burden of proof is not necessary
in a strict liability case since there is no need to prove any negli-
gence on the part of the defendant.7 Barker is significant, how-
ever, in determining when a design case will get to the jury.78 The
court held that once the plaintiff proves that his injury was proxi-
that the loader was defective because it was not equipped with a roll bar and seat belts. Id.
at 230.
72. Id. at 234 (italics omitted). The Supreme Court of Alaska has adopted the Barker
test for design defects. See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 884 (Alaska 1979).
73. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 233 n.7.
74. Id. at 236.
75. Id. at 237-39.
76. Id. at 237.
77. Wade, supra note 3, at 573.
78. Id. But cf. Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 577 P.2d 1322 (Or. 1978). The Wilson
court held that the design issue should not be submitted to the jury "unless the court is
satisfied that there is evidence from which the jury could find [that] the suggested alterna-
tives are not only technically feasible but also practicable in terms of cost and the over-all
design and operation of the product." Id. at 1327.
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mately caused by the design, the case can then get to the jury.1
Thus, the Barker standard would presumably allow more cases to
reach the jury; if such is the case, liability of manufacturers for
defective products would be increased correspondingly.8"
The decision of the Texas Supreme Court in Turner v. General
Motors Corp.,8 1 is significant for its rejection of a bifurcated jury
instruction which arose in the early years of the strict liability doc-
trine. The bifurcated instruction provided that a product was de-
fective if it would not 1) meet the reasonable safety expectations of
the ordinary consumer or 2) be placed on the market by a prudent
manufacturer who was aware of the danger involved in its alleged
defect.82 The first prong arose because many courts initially used
warranty theories to arrive at strict liability."s The second prong
was developed because many courts and commentators thought the
test should be derived from the law of torts rather than the law of
contracts.8 4 The Texas court rejected these tests because of the
"inclusiveness of the idea that jurors would know what ordinary
consumers would expect in the consumption or use of a product, or
that jurors would or could apply any standard or test outside that
of their own experiences and expectations." 85 Although the appel-
late court had substituted a list of four factors to be balanced by
the jury in determining liability,8 e the supreme court reversed,
holding that the issue was solely whether the product was defec-
tively designed.87 The court then approved the following definition
as part of the instruction: "By the term 'defectively designed' as
79. 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
80. See Comment, supra note 2, at 674.
81. 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979). In Turner, the plaintiff was injured when the car's roof
caved in as he overturned his car seeking to avoid a collision with a truck. Id. at 845-46.
82. Id. at 850. See also Wade, supra note 3, at 554-56.
83. Wade, supra note 3, at 555.
84. Id. at 556.
85. 584 S.W.2d at 851.
86. Id. at 846. The four factors to be balanced in determining liability were:
(1) the utility of the product to the user and to the public as a whole weighed
against the gravity and likelihood of injury from its use;
(2) the availability of a substitute product which would meet the same need
and not be unsafe or unreasonably expensive;
(3) the manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the product
without seriously impairing its usefulness or significantly increasing its costs;
(4) the user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the product
and their avoidability because of general public knowledge of the obvious condi-
tion of the product, or of the existence of suitable warnings or instructions.
Id. at 846 (quoting General Motors Corp. v. Turner, 567 S.W.2d 812, 818 (Tex. Civ. App.
1978)).
87. Id. at 847.
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
used in this issue is meant a product that is unreasonably danger-
ous as designed, taking into consideration the utility of the product
and the risk involved in its use."88
Addressing the use of the balancing factors, the court held that
"[e]vidence upon the factors of risk and utility such as those enu-
merated . . . may be admissible. . . .As to this, however, we dis-
approve the holding . . . that the jury is to be instructed to bal-
ance specifically enumerated factors . . .,.
With the exception of the shift in the burden of proof, the Tur-
ner court's explanation of the balancing process is essentially the
same as that used in Barker. The Barker court, however, held that
the jury be specifically instructed to balance certain factors. In
fact, many commentators have suggested a list of factors that
should be considered in determining whether a product is defec-
tive.90 The Turner court correctly refused to provide the jury with
a long list of policy factors to be balanced. Indeed, although Dean
Wade has promulgated such a list 9 he has acknowledged that pro-
viding an abstract list of policy factors to the jury is only likely to
confuse them.92 Instead, the jury should be instructed to consider
whether the design could be made safer taking into account the
feasibility of design, its costs, and the state of technology at the
time of the design.' 3
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court is the only court to have elim-
inated any sort of risk/utility analysis in its jury instruction.9 As
did the Barker court, the Pennsylvania court rejected the "unrea-
sonably dangerous" language of the Restatement as a proper in-
struction for the jury, noting that "it is primarily designed to pro-
vide guidance for the bench and bar."'0 The court held that while
"the phrase 'unreasonably dangerous' serves a useful purpose in
predicting liability in this area, it does not follow that this lan-
guage should be used in framing the issues for the jury's considera-
tion.''96 The court continued its departure from the norm by hold-
88. Id. at 847 n.1. See generally Henderson, supra note 50, at 773.
89. 584 S.W.2d at 847.
90. For a list of the factors promulgated by some of the leading commentators, see
Montgomery & Owen supra note 32, at 815-17 nn.43-46.
91. Wade, supra note 38, at 837.
92. Wade, supra note 3, at 572-73.
93. Id.
94. Azzarello v. Black Bros., 391 A.2d 1020 (Pa. 1978). In Azzarello, the plaintiff suffered
injury when his hand was pinched between two hard rubber rolls in a coating machine man-
ufactured and sold by the defendant. Id. at 1022.
95. Id. at 1026.
96. Id.
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ing that: "It is a judicial function to decide whether, under
plaintiff's averment of the facts, recovery would be justified; and
only after this judicial determination is made is the cause submit-
ted to the jury to determine whether the facts of the case support
the averments of the complaint." In effect, the court recognized
the need for balancing risk versus utility,98 but reserved the task
for the judge and not the jury. This is a novel position with which
at least one writer has agreed, suggesting that the complicated is-
sues of liability in a product liability case are best handled by the
trial judge.9"
The Pennsylvania court approved the following jury instruction
for defective design:
The [supplier] of a product is the guarantor of its safety. The
product must, therefore, be provided with every element neces-
sary to make it safe for [its intended] use, and without any condi-
tion that makes it unsafe for [its intended] use. If you find that
the product, at the time it left the defendant's control, lacked any
element necessary to make it safe for [its intended] use or con-
tained any condition that made it unsafe for [its intended] use,
then the product was defective, and the defendant is liable for all
harm caused by such defect.'"
This language is simple, strong, and to the point. Yet it also has
the effect of confusing the juror as to what constitutes a "safe"
product. Additionally, although the court emphasizes that the
manufacturer is not absolutely liable for his product,10 1 this charge
suggests that the manufacturer is an insurer. Even though Justice
Nix defined the term "guarantor" as requiring that "the supplier
must at least provide a product which is designed to make it safe
for the intended use," '' the qualification does not cure the in-
struction's deficiency, because the definition is not incorporated
into the instruction.
VI. CONCLUSION
The court's holding in Hill is proper, even though it creates
more confusion than it resolves. Extending the strict liability doc-
97. Id.
98. "These are questions of law and their resolution depends upon social policy." Id.
99. Fischer, Products Liability-Functionally Imposed Strict Liability, 32 OKLA. L.
REV. 93 (1979).
100. 391 A.2d at 1027 n.12 (brackets in original).
101. Id. at 1024.
102. Id. at 1027.
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trine to a second collision situation is a natural consequence of
providing consumers the maximum protection in the marketplace.
A more difficult situation arises in the context of a manufacturer's
defective design. Because the instructions to the jury are critically
important in this area, the supreme court missed its opportunity to
illuminate the differences between the negligence and strict liabil-
ity theories of recovery in a design defect case and effectuate the
strong social policy behind strict products liability. In fact, much
of the court's language only serves to confuse the state of the law
for products liability in Florida.
It is here urged that the Florida Supreme Court accept the fol-
lowing jury instruction for defining a defect in design:
In this case, the plaintiff is claiming that the manufacturer's
product is defective in design. In order to establish that this
product is defective, the plaintiff must prove that the product is
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or to
any foreseeable bystander.
This burden is met when the plaintiff proves that the alleged
defective design was the proximate cause of his injury and that
there was an alternative design which the defendant could have
used that would have eliminated or substantially reduced his in-
jury. If the plaintiff proves this, then the defendant, in order to
be absolved from liability, must prove that the plaintiff's alterna-
tive is not feasible in light of its costs, practicability to the overall
design of the entire product, and current technology.
In deciding whether the respective parties have met their bur-
dens, your task is to measure the utility of the product against
the risks inherent in introducing it into the stream of commerce.
In doing so, you are reminded that the manufacturer is not abso-
lutely liable for all injuries caused by his product. Some products
are sufficiently beneficial to society that the risks inherent in us-
ing them are justifiable. You must decide if the benefits of this
product outweigh the risks of the design and were justifiable in
light of the claimed harm to plaintiff.
This charge illuminates the issue for judge and jury. It places the
burden on the plaintiff to prove there was an alternative design
which the defendant could have utilized that would have avoided
harm to him. If the plaintiff proves the existence of an alternative,
then the defendant must prove that this alternative was not practi-
cable in order to relieve him of liability. This is a fairer alternative
to the Barker standard, yet it still places the burden on the defen-
dant in areas such as cost and technology in which he has the
greater knowledge. In addition, the charge sets forth the balancing
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standard that the jury must employ in a design defect case. While
this instruction does not cover all the aspects that a jury might
consider in a design case, it does call the juror's attention to as-
pects of the case which will help to facilitate their analysis.
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